Nothing But Words

Watching events unfold in these days leading up to the elections in Iraq, I thought of political scientist Samuel Huntington, a Harvard professor who is “an old-fashioned Democrat…a dying breed: someone who combines liberal ideals with a deeply conservative understanding of history and foreign policy.” (Robert Kaplan, 11/19/01). In my political science days I read his book Political Order in Changing Societies, which influenced my understanding of democratization like no other. The book is now over 35 years old, but it’s as relevant as ever. In it, Huntington uses a series of case studies to explain why transitions to democracy are so difficult to pull off successfully.

One of his points is that you can’t equate democracy with elections: “The problem,” Huntington wrote, “is not to hold elections but to create organizations.” By that he meant functional organizations of government and civil society. Even if Iraq gets through its elections without major bloodshed, the biggest challenges are still to come.

A question that often turns up on comparative politics tests is “What societal conditions are necessary for democracy to succeed?” The opening sentence of Political Order in Changing Societies nails the most important aspect of the answer:

The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, [and] stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities.

Starting from this perspective, it becomes a lot easier to understand why a country like Japan – with little history of democracy – was able to successfully transition to it after World War II. Despite the devastion wrought by the war, the nation’s long-established sense of community and respect for civil institutions and authority remained. It also becomes easier to understand why a country like Iraq – which quite clearly lacks such qualities – will face overwhelming challenges in trying to rapidly create a functioning democracy.

I picked Japan as the counter-example because, like Iraq, its transition to democracy was brought at the point of a US gun. While the US has commited far fewer resources to post-war Iraq than it did to post-war Japan, and planned for the occupation far more poorly, what’s just as striking is the contrast between the two countries in regard to the qualities Huntington listed.

Politically, the Bush administration currently faces a true dilemma in Iraq. On the one hand, holding elections before violence is quelled and civil institutions are functioning is putting the cart before the horse. In modern times, countries which have made at least semi-successful transitions to democracy have either had a pre-existing familiarity with it (such as Estonia after the Cold War) or had a popular “benevolent dictator” who focused his energies on creating governmental institutions that inherited his legitimacy when he left the scene (such as Ataturk in Turkey).

On the other hand, installing a strongman (no matter how benevolent), after having just removed one, is not a viable political option for Bush. Add to that the administration’s pre-war predictions of an easy rebuilding process, and the media-driven requirement for Bush to demonstrate rapid progess in Iraq, and you end up with “…an aggressive White House communications strategy…to frame the risky Iraqi election – a critical test of [Bush's] assertion that the country is on the path to stability – in the best possible light. The goal, a Bush advisor said, was not only to lower expectations but to avoid any definition of success.” (New York Times, 1/27/05).

Bush’s domestic political need for a quick Iraqi transition to democracy has little overlap with what Iraq really needs: massive, long-term, disciplined, focused investment in the development of its economy and civil institutions (the consequence of Powell’s “Pottery Barn rule”). Without first meeting Iraq’s most basic needs for a functioning society, a democratic transition is an incredibly shaky proposition. Hence the self-contradicting goal of raising hopes while lowering expectations in Bush’s communication strategy.

Unfortunately, the Bush administration’s myopic decisions to date have narrowed the range of available strategies to paradoxical choices. Maintaining a US military presence in Iraq fans the flames of terrorism, and the resulting violence debilitates the democratic process. But without the US propping up the democratic process and dispersing concentrated elements of unrest (as in Fallujah), civil war becomes a very real possibility.

Saddam Hussein’s destruction of his country’s civil society, followed by his sudden removal and our bungling of the occupation, has left Iraq devoid of the political qualities Huntington listed as precursors to any well functioning and respected government, democratic or otherwise. They are not qualities that are quickly or easily replaced.